UN Drone Crashes in DRC

A Selex EX Falco unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) crashed today.  The aircraft crashed at the airport in Goma in Eastern DRC, where the aircraft are based.  There does not appear to be any reporting yet on what might have caused the crash.  Initial reporting by the wire services, variously citing DRC or UN officials, seems suggest there is some uncertainty about whether the aircraft was leaving for or returning from a mission.

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The city of Goma in the highlighted zone has historically been a major point of contention in the region.

MONUSCO only received the drones at the end of 2013 and they were expected to help monitor the activities of the numerous armed groups active in DRC.  If there have been no additions to the proposed force, then this reduced the MONUSCO fleet to four unmanned aircraft.  Later reports indicated that the drone’s surveillance equipment was undamaged and repairs would allow the aircraft to return to operations.

Concerns about the basic safety of drones have been a matter for debate domestically in both the US and Europe, and were also said to have been the primary motivator for moving US drone operations in Djibouti from Camp Lemonnier to a remote desert airstrip, Chabelley Airfield, last September.  The issue of basic safety in these operations will no doubt become a matter of debate in this instance as well.

A team of technicians prepare a Falco unmanned aerial vehicle for the inaugural flight in Goma, North Kivu province, during an official ceremony organized in the presence of Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, on 3 December 2013.

The crash also comes as the UN reports that elements of M23 may be active again and possibly recruiting new fighters.  Representatives for M23 have denied this, but that very fact highlights what has been said here and by other observers about the ongoing uncertain.  M23’s final status remains up for debate, and accusations about support from Rwanda and Uganda remain unresolved.  This potential connection should not be dismissed out of hand, especially in light of accusations that Rwandan authorities orchestrated the murder of a Rwandan dissident in South Africa earlier this month.  Even if M23 is gone for good, there remains a significant number of rebel groups that threaten security in eastern DRC, such as the FDLR, which MONUSCO said it would focus on following the military defeat of M23 last year.

DRC and M23 Sign Deal in Kenya

While the focus here at Codebook: Africa has been on developments in CAR, it is important to note that authorities from the Democratic Republic of Congo and representatives of the M23 rebel group signed a deal formally ending hostilities in Kenya on Thursday.  A deal brokered by Uganda had stalled out, in no small part due to the issues of the final status of former rebels and reported Ugandan support for the group.  Many M23 rebels, including its military chief Sultani Makenga, had fled into Uganda, and Uganda had said it had no intention of repatriating them to the DRC without their consent.

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo showing the approximate zone of conflict with the M23 rebel group. The city of Goma has historically been a major point of contention in the region and one can see the tri-border region with Uganda and Rwanda, both accused of providing support to M23.

Given these issues it is no wonder that a final agreement was brokered by a different third party, one that the DRC would believe was actually acting as a neutral facilitator.  However, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni was reportedly at the event.  The arrangement reached in Kenya saw DRC and M23 representatives sign separate declarations.  The DRC pledged to help demobilize and reintegrate former M23 members back into society, while the M23 representatives reiterated the end of the movement as an armed group.  No amnesty for those believed to be responsible for war crimes was included.  DRC President Joseph Kabila was said to have been hailed by other African leaders present at the ceremony for signing the DRC’s document.  The US and UN also responded positively to the deal.

As always it remains to be seen how this new agreement will play out.  As previously noted here and elsewhere, M23 was only the latest iteration of Tutsi rebels in the region.  There is nothing to say that grievances, real or imagined, of government inattention or outright hostility to the Tutsi minority in eastern DRC might not again provoke a return to open conflict.  With the status of former M23 members in Uganda remaining uncertain, there is the possibility that members of the group could return to set up a new armed movement.

In addition, M23 was only one of a myriad of armed groups in DRC, including a large number of localized and independent “Mai Mai” militias, said to act in self-defense against the other more formalized movements.  The UN has already looked to launching offensives against some of these groups like it did against M23.  The activities of the UN’s intervention brigade in DRC, formed this year, were said to have been instrumental in the rapid collapse of M23 at the beginning of last month.  This past week, the brigade launched a new offensive against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu rebel group operating in DRC.  Whether this is really the beginning of a new chapter for the DRC, its clear that there is a long way left to go.

Spotlight on Military Aviation in Africa

News items today seems to highlight a certain importance of military aviation in current operations across the continent.  Boko Haram militants attacked an airbase in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in Nigeria’s north today, along with other targets.  The attack on the airbase was described as large-scale and coordinated, and let to the damage or destruction of two helicopters and three military fixed-wing aircraft.  Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence spokesman Brigadier General Chris Olukolade said that the fixed-wing aircraft were decommissioned, and that the two helicopters were “incapacitated.”  It is unclear what this might mean in terms of the severity of the damage or whether the aircraft were total losses.

Map released by AFRICOM in its 2013 posture statement showing the approximate areas and density of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria in 2012.  Maiduguri can be seen marked in the northeast corner of the country, partially obscured by a graphic indicating “31+ attacks,” the high attack density marked on the map.

Borno state has been one of the primary hot-spots in Nigeria’s campaign against Boko Haram militants.  In may a state of emergency was declared in Borno, and twenty-four hour curfew has been put in place following today’s attacks.  The attack on the airbase is in many ways unsurprising.  In May, the following the increase in violence in places like Borno, the Nigerian military began launching airstrikes against Boko Haram camps.  This was said by observers at the time to represent a significant escalation in the government response.  As recently as the end of last month, Nigeria had again launched air strikes against Boko Haram.  Striking back at this capability would no doubt have been a key priority for the militant group.  Boko Haram, along with a splinter group called Ansaru, were designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States in November.

Also, it was reported today that a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, would be heading to the Democratic Republic of Congo this week to begin operations.  The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) will receive five drones of an unspecified type.  United Nations peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous has described the additions as an “essential tool” for the mission.  The utility of drones in peacekeeping operations has been a matter for debate, especially as other elements of the UN seek to develop an international position that may place limits on elements of what has been described as “robotic warfare.”  It is felt, however, that in DRC, the drones would provide peacekeepers with additional tools to monitor movements by the country’s various rebel groups and more rapidly respond to protect civilian populations under threat.  The drones have been describe as “protection technology” by the United Nations.

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo showing the approximate zone of conflict. The city of Goma has historically been a major point of contention and one can see the tri-border region with Uganda and Rwanda.

The issue of protecting civilians especially important with regards to DRC, as UN forces had been criticized for their lack of intervention on behalf of civilians threatened by fighting related to the M23 group at the end of last year and earlier this year.  The UN responded by stepping up patrols and ultimately activated an “intervention brigade” to carry out mobile operations.  This force was said to be in no small way responsible for the decision by the M23 leadership to surrender or flee the country at the beginning of November.  The deal that was to end the fighting between the government and M23 remains delayed indefinitely, though DRC President Joseph Kabila has flown to Uganda today in hopes of reviving the negotiations.  The status and fate of M23 militants and their leadership remains the most significant impediment to a final agreement.  In addition, a large number of other anti-government militant groups remain active in DRC, most notably the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).  A plethora of other smaller, localized groups also exist, broadly categorized as “Mai Mai.”

Peace Deal Between DRC and M23 Delayed Indefinitely

As noted earlier here and explained in more detail in a good piece over at War is Boring, the announcement by DRC authorities that the M23 rebel group had suffered military defeat did not necessarily carry much weight for the future of Africa’s Great Lakes region.  This has turned out very quickly to more than mere idle speculation as Ugandan mediators said today that it appeared that a peace deal that had planned to be signed today between DRC authorities and M23 rebels has apparently been postponed indefinitely.

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo showing the approximate zone of conflict. The city of Goma has historically been a major point of contention and one can see the tri-border region with Uganda and Rwanda.

Uganda, which has been mediating between the two groups since last December, said that while the DRC delegation was in Entebbe to sign the agreement, they had requested to read the final text of the agreement before entering the conference room for the signing.  The ceremony was suspended indefinitely after the DRC contingent spent over four hours going over the text.  Ugandan officials said the they conferred in private so it was unclear what specific issues with the text there might be.

It is not too hard to imagine a possible complaints the DRC delegation may have had.  The biggest is probably the fate of M23 members who have fled into Uganda.  Possible amnesty or reintegration of certain members of the M23 group had already been a major stumbling block in negotiations.  On Friday, the Ugandan government made it clear it would not deport fleeing M23 members back to the DRC.  While Ugandan officials made it clear that the fate of these individuals would have to be a component of any peace deal, it also said that those not wishing to return to the DRC would not be forcibly repatriated and would instead be turned over to UN agencies to see whether they qualified for refugee status.  This no doubt is compounded by previous accusations of Uganda actively supporting the M23 rebellion along with Rwanda.

UPDATE (11/12/13): The DRC’s Information Minister Lambert Mende has effectively confirmed the above suspicions by accusing the Ugandans as acting like a party to the conflict.  The DRC also wanted the agreement to be called a “declaration” rather than an “accord” or “peace agreement” as sought by the Ugandans and M23.  The DRC is of the view that calling it a peace agreement gives the text different weight and M23 increased legitimacy, despite that fact that M23’s leadership had already unilaterally called for an end to its armed struggle in DRC.  In response, Ugandan authorities said that without an agreement M23 could still regroup.  Uganda’s Deputy Foreign Minister Okello Oryem added that M23 chief Sultani Makenga, who fled to Uganda, was not a prisoner and that his status would only be resolved in an agreement between the DRC and the rebel group.  Rwanda, also accused of having support M23 in DRC, has been notably silent on the events.

Rebellion in Eastern DRC Over…Until its Not

On 5 November 2013, M23 President Bertrand Bisimwa released a statement that requested rebel commanders prepare fighters for “disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration.”  This announcement comes as Congolese government spokesman Lambert Mende told members of the press that military operations effectively ended overnight, following the capture of rebel positions in the tri-border region between DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda.  The rebel held areas in Tshanzu and Runyoni had been the only ones still in M23 control as DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) and UN elements had continued a major offensive against the group.  African leaders meeting in South Africa to discuss the security situation in the Great Lakes region had also called for an end to the fighting.

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo showing the approximate zone of conflict. The city of Goma has historically been a major point of contention and one can see the tri-border region with Uganda and Rwanda.

The future of the region, however, remains uncertain.  For one, Bisimwa has already stated that he intends to continue to pursue his group’s goals through political means.  This highlights that while M23 may be militarily defeated, its leadership does not view the matter as settled.  The sources of conflict between ethnic Tutsi in DRC’s Kivu region and the central government remain unresolved, as does the issue of alleged involvement of Uganda and Rwanda in supporting ethnic Tutsi aspirations in the region.

M23 itself had spawned from rebels who had previously fought the central government over similar grievances before coming to an agreement in 2009 and being integrated into the FARDC.  It is also not the first time DRC authorities have tried this, having attempted to integrate National Committee for the Defense of the People (CNDP) rebels into the FARDC as part of a peace plan in 2006, which also failed to produce a lasting peace.  Unless the government has a way to address the significant differences in opinion, there is nothing to suggest that a similar outcome is not in the offing.  This is especially so seeing as members of M23, notably its military chief Sultani Makenga, were reported to have fled into either Uganda or Rwanda, rather than enter into a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.  One can only hope that the DRC’s government will take advantage of this military victory to address the sources of conflict, possibly with the help of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

M23 Rebels Call for Ceasefire as African Leaders Prepare for Summit

The leader of the M23 rebel group, operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s historically restive eastern region, issued a statement today calling for a cease-fire with the central government.  Bertrand Bisimwa’s call comes as government forces continue to make gains against M23 strongholds and as African leaders prepare to meet in South Africa to discuss a way forward in the Great Lakes Region.

UN-backed talks between the DRC government and M23 rebels, being held in Uganda, were said to have stalled in October.  The major point of disagreement was reported to be the desire by M23 negotiators to secure an amnesty for their members.  The DRC government is likely wary of issuing such an amnesty given M23’s history, having spawned from demobilized rebels who were integrated into the DRC security forces in 2009 as part of a previous peace agreement.

United Nations peacekeeping forces have also been active in attempting to protect civilians from the conflict.  Concerned by the persistence of the conflict in the country’s east earlier this year, the United Nations approved the activation of a reaction brigade in DRC in response to the expanding crisis in the country’s east.  The activities of this brigade, authorized to take more offensive action, have also been seen as a reason for government government victories against the M23 group.

DRC’s eastern region, notably the Kivu region, has seen persistent conflict for years now due to various issues, including its ethnography.  M23’s members are primary ethnic Tutsi, and have been reported to received assistance from Rwanda and Uganda, though both countries have denied this.  M23 is also only the latest in a series of rebel groups, which the DRC government has continually attempted to strike deals with and otherwise integrate into its security forces.

This perpetual conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes Region prompted a meeting between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which led to an agreement in February to continue to coordinate and seek lasting peace in the region.  Another summit organized by the SADC and ICGLR is scheduled to begin tomorrow.

Operation Observant Compass in the News

A version of this post appeared first on GlobalSecurity.org’s blog Frantic Goat.

Yesterday, the Washington Post published a good article on the unreported US mission to support efforts to support a number of African partners neutralize the threat of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader Joseph Kony. Though not mentioned in the Post’s piece, this operation is entitled Operation Observant Compass. The article does a good job pointing out the nuances of the effort, Codebook: Africa’s new profile and GlobalSecurity.org’s existing profile both provide important added granularity.

Lord’s Resistance Army Area of Operations, for the period of 1 February 2012 to 31 January 2013

For instance, the request to deploy CV-22B aircraft, likely from assets recently deployed to Europe, is part of an ongoing effort by the US mission to expand the ability of regional forces to respond to new intelligence. Increased mobility and intelligence gathering capability is really what the US brings to the counter-LRA effort (abbreviated C-LRA). The CV-22B aircraft would provide an immediate response to capabilities the US is currently in the process of sourcing through the private sector. In July of this year, Request for Information for both dedicated rotary-wing and fixed-wing support were put out, and these just recently turned into active solicitations for bids. Being able to rapidly shuttle personnel and supplies between the forward operating locations supporting Observant Compass is critical to the effort, as is noted in the Post article.

This gets into another point not elaborated on in that article. The operating location in Obo, Central Africa Republic had been a critical element of the operation. While the article notes that CAR essentially became a no-go area after the coup earlier this year, what is left out is that CAR was home to the C-LRA Operations Fusion Center (COFC), and had been the center of gravity for US support to the effort. After the coup, the US looked to make a shift into Nzara in South Sudan, another known operating location for this mission. This was evidenced by the fact that on 1 May 2013, the US Army issued a solicitation for a contract to provide up to 140,000 liters per month of JET-A aviation fuel and associated refueling services for the support of C-145 or comparable aircraft at Nzara Landing Zone, Republic of South Sudan. The C-145 is the US designation, recently applied, to the Polish M-28 Skytruck, which have been part of US Special Operations Command’s Non-Standard Aviation fleet and which are currently among the few air assets available to the C-LRA effort.